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FERRY RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN PROPRIETORS.
SEc. 1. Subject stated.
We do not propose at this time to enter upon a general exami-
nation of the subject of Ferries and Ferry Rights. We are aware
of no treatise which presents the existing state of the law on this
sajeet, and we may hereafter discuss in the Register other
branches of it. The present article is designed as a monograph
upon the division. of the subject stated in the title-the ferry
rig.t of riparian proprietors.
The loose and inconsistent statements in some of the cases have
tecded to obscure the law relating to parts of this subject, and
hare led us to examine it with considerable care.
It will conduce to perspicuous treatment to consider-
1. The common law rights of riparian proprietors in respect
to feri"a.
2. Their statutory rights in this respect.
3. ow these rights may be extinguished or taken away-effect
of loation of public highway, fc.
SEc. 2. Perry Bights of Riparian Proprietors at common law.
Hare it is essential to bear in mind the distinction between
what may be called q common or public ferry, that is, a ferry for
the transportation of the public generally for toll, and a private
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ferry, that is, a ferry-if it may be so called-intended exclu-
sively for the owner, or the owner and his family. Properly
speaking, the latter is not a ferry.
The right to establish and keep a public ferry is a franchise,
which is, in England, a royal privilege in the hands of a subject:
2 BI. Com. 37; 3 Kent Com. 458.
The subject of public ferries is obviously one which requires
governmental control. It is one of the usual and ordinary func-
tions of the state to provide safe and convenient roads and
bridges. Ferries are projections of the ordinary highway over
streams. They have been aptly styled floating bridges.
The state, usually through designated local office;s or tribunals,
determines whether it will accommodate the public by means of
ferries or bridges. When ferries are relied on, then to secure the
requisite attention to the wants of the public, and to compensate
the ferry-owner, he is authorized to levy ferriage, and has rights
more or less exclusive conferred upon him. It is necessary, to
prevent imposition upon the public, that the rates of ferriage be
fixed by law. "For," says REEsE, J., arguendo, in The Nash-
ville Bridge Co. vs. Shelby, 10 Yerg. 280, 281 (A. D. 1837), " no
greater evil could well be imagined than the unrestrained power
on the part of individuals to exact from the traveller, who cannot
brook delay or stipulate for terms, whatever cupidity might
dictate."
For these reasons the franchise in England is in the Crown,
and in this country in the State. The doctrine that a public
ferry cannot be set up or exercised by any of the king's subjects
without prescription, or a charter or grant from the king, is fun-
damental and undisputed. Thus, says the court (Willes's Rep.
512 (A. D. 1744), Blisset vs. Hart, note), "c a fefry is publicijuris.
It -is a franchise which no one can erect without a license from
the Crown. * * * If a second be erected without license the
Crown has a remedy by quo warranto, and the former grantee
has a remedy by action." In further support and illustration of
this point, consult 2 Rol. Abr. 140; 3 Jacob 'Law Dict. 40; 1.
Comyn Dig., Action on Case for Nuisance (A), p. 428; 5 Id. tit.
Piscary, 867; Woolrych on Waters 46; Stark vs. Mcaowen, 1
Nott & McCord 387, and authorities cited; Benson vs. Mayor,
I'c., of New York, 10 Barb. 223, 234, 245, per BARcULO, J.;
Nashville vs. Shelby, 10, Yerg. (Tenn.) 280 ; Young vs. Harrison,
6 Georgia Rep. 131; s. . 3 Kelly 31; s. a. again, 9 Georg. 859;
FERRY RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN PROPRIETORS.
Id. 517; Dyer vs. Bridge Co., 2 Port. (Ala.) 296; Lansing vs.
Smith, 4 Wend. 21, per WALWORTH, Chan.; Somerville vs. Wivz-
bish, 7 Gratt. (Va.) 205 (1850). And see also the authorities
below cited.
It is sometimes asserted that there is a right of ferry which at
common law is appendant or appurtenant to riparian ownership
upon navigable fresh-water rivers, such as the Hudson, Susque-
hanna, Ohio, Mississippi, &c. Thus, in speaking of riparian
rights on the Ohio, the late Mr. Justice MCLEAN, in Bowman vs.
Wathen, 2 McLean Rep. 376, says: , He (the riparian owner)
has the right of fishery, of ferry, and every other right which
is properly appendant to the owner of the soil; and he holds
every one of these rights by as sacred a tenure as he holds the
land from which they emanate. The state cannot directly or
indirectly divest him of any of these rights, except by the consti-
tutional exercise of the right to appropriate private property for
public purposes."
There is a sense in which it is true that the riparian owner has
a it right of ferry," but this right of ferry, if it be so called, is
simply the exclusive right to land upon and use his own soil.
'If he has a right of ferry at all, it is the right tj a private ferry
as above defined. The riparian owner as such has not the right
to establish a public ferry. A ferry franchise is not an incident,
either in England or this country, to the ownership of land on
the margin of a stream. And Mr. Justice McLEAN, in the
extract above given, is not to be understood as speaking of a
ferry franchise as appendant to the soil, but of the "€right of
ferry" in the limited and subordinate sense above indicated.
The c*ommon law rights of riparian proprietors in respect to
ferries are thus authoritatively and clearly stated by Sir MATTHEW
HALE in De Jure Maris-a work whose varied and exhaustive
learning well merits its distinguished and enduring reputation :-
In Chapter I., "c Concerning M1e interest of fresh rivers," he
lays down the rule that "Fresh rivers, of what kind soever, do,
of common right, belong to the owners of the soil adjacent; so
that the owners of the one side have, of common tight, the pro-
perty of the soil, and consequently the right of fishing, usque
filum aquce," &c. "Though fresh rivers are, in poiRt of pro-
priety, as before, primdfacie of private interest (ownership), yet
as well fresh rivers as salt, or such as flow and reflow, may be
under two servitudes, or affected by them, viz.: one of preroga-
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tive belonging to the king, and another of public interest, or
belonging to the people in general. Of these in the ensuing
chapters."
Chapter II., concerning -the right of prerogative in private or
fresh rivers," thus lays down the respective rights of the Crown
and riparian owner with reference to ferries:-
", The king," continues Bir Matthew, "c by an ancient right of
prerogative, hath had a certain interest in many fresh rivers, even
where the sea doth not flow and reflow, as well as in salt or arm
of the sea; and those are these which follow:
"1st. A right of franchise or privilege that no man may set
up a common ferry for all passengers, without a prescription time
out of mind, or a charter from the king. He [the ownpr of the
adjacent soil] may make a ferry for his own use or the use of his
family; but not for the common use of all of the king's subjects
passing that way." And he proceeds to assign the reason thus;
" Because it doth, in consequent, tend to a common charge; and
is become a thing of public interest and use, and.every man for
his passage pays a toll, which is a common charge,- and every
ferry ought to be under a public regulation, viz. : that the keeper
give attendance at due times, keep a boat in due order, and take
but reasonable toll; for if he (he ferryman) fail in these he is
fineable." "And this that is said in reference to a fresh or pri-
vate river, holds place much more in a public river or arm of the
sea." " No man," (Id. cap. III.) "can take a settled or constant
toll even in his own private land, for a common passage, without
the kiog's license."
Vide 6 Cowen Rep. 536 note, where the first four chapters of
De Jure Maris are reprinted.
While upon this subject we may observe that it is laid down in
an old case in Savile's Reports (23 Eliz.), p. 11, "that he who
has the privilege of a ferry ought to own the land on both sidgs
of the river, for he cannot land upon the soil'of another without
his consent." But to this extent this is no longer law. This
will appear by reference to the case of Peter vs. Kendal, 6 Barn.
& Cres. 703 (1827), in which it was decided that while the owner
of a ferry must have the right to use the land for the purpose of
embarking and disembarking passengers, he need not necessarily
own the soil. HOLROYD, J., there says: cc I think what is laid
down in Savile is not law to the extent to which it is there stated.
The owner of a ferry must, as an incident to the ferry, have such
PERRY RIGHTS OF RIPARIAN PROPRIETORS.
a right to use the land on both sides as to enable him to embark
and disembark passengers, but he need not for that purpose have
any property in the soil. It is sufficient if he has the right to use
the land for all purposes of his ferry." And to the same effect
is the opinion of BAILEY, J., in the same case. Recognised as
oorrect, per BALDWIN, J., in Patrick vs. Bufnere, 2 Rob. (Va.)
Rep. 209,.217 (1843).
That a party, even though he be a riparian proprietor and own
the land on both sides of the stream, cannot, without the consent
of the state, set up and operate a public ferry and levy ferriage
or tolls, see the authorities above cited, and particularly, Young
vs. Harrison, 6 Georgia 131 (1849), s. c. 9 Id. 359; Arashvillc
vs. Shelby, 10 Yerg. (Tenn.) 280 (1837); Allen vs. PFarngwort,
5 Id. 189; Sparks vs. TWite, 7 Humph. (Tenn.) 86 (1846);
Trustees, c., vs. Tatman, 13 Ill. 27 (1851); Pipkin vs. Wynns,
2 Dev. (Law) North Car. 402 (1880), per HENDERSON, C. J.;
Cooper vs. Smith, 9 Serg. & Raw. 26, 33 (1832); Murray vs.
Menefee, 20 Ark. Rep. 560; Id. 573 (1859); Milton vs. Hoden,
32 Ala.-30 (1858); Dane Abr. ch. 67, p. 653; Stark vs. MeGowen,
1 Nott & McCord (South Car.) 387 (1818) (well-considered case);
Mills County vs. St. Clair, 2 Gillm. (Ill.) 197 (1845), affirmed by
Supreme Court of United States, 8 How. 569;, Stark vs. Jiller,
3 Mo. Rep. 470 (1834); Gales vs. Anderson, 13 Ill. R. 413 (1851);
Bush vs. Bridge C'o., 3 Porter (Ind.) 21 (1851); The People vs.
Te Mayor, &'c., of New York, 32 Barb. 102; Somerville vs.
Wimbish, 7 Gratt. (Va.) 205 (1850); Norris vs. The Farmers,
ft., Co., 6 Cal. 590 (1856); Taylor vs. Bailroad Co., 4 Jones,
(Law) North Car. 277 (1857); Johnson vs. Er8kine, 9 Texas 1
(1852).
It may be confidently affirmed that in England the grant of the
Crown to A. to keep a ferry, will not authorize him to enter upon
or use the land of B. in order to operate the ferry.
The Crown in England may confer a ferry franchise upon a
person other than the. riparian proprietor, but this will be una-
vailing unless the right to use the land of such proprietor is
obtained, or unless the ferry be operated from the lands of the
Crown or of the public.
From this circumstance arises whatever superior claim the ripa-
rian proprietor has to other subjects to be invested with a ferry
franchise : Somerville vs. Wimbish, above cited; Cooper vs. Smith,
9 Serg. & R. 33, and authorities, supra.
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The authorities before referred to abundantly establish that in
this country a ferry franchise must be conferred by the govern-
ment; must be founded upon prescription or' grant or license;
that ownership of the soil will not give the right to set up or
operate a public ferry for toll; that the most such riparian owner-
ship can do is to authorize the proprietor to establish a private
ferry for his own convenience, or at most to ferry, not for tolls,
that is, for a fixed price independent of contract, but upon con-
tract express or implied when not forbidden by statute, and when
this does not interfere with or injuriously affect any established
public ferry.
These, aside from statute, constitute the ferry rights of riparian
proprietors.
SEc. 3. Statutory Btights of Biparian Proprietors in respect to
Ferries.
It is not practicable to set forth in detail the provisions of the
statutes of the several states on this subject. In general, in this
country, the Legislature invests designated public officers or local
tribunals, usually the county courts or county commissioners, with
the jurisdiction or power to establish and regulate public ferries.
And these statutes usually declare in substance, that in establish-
ing a new ferry preference shall be given to the owner of the
land, if he is a suitable or proper person.
* These statutes, recognising the priority of right in the riparian
owner to be invested with the franchise, if the public authorities
shall see fit to establish a ferry, are founded upon the wise and
salutary maxim or policy of the common law, which, to prevent
confusion, assigns rights capable of being thus enjoyed, to a legal
and determinate owner: Cooper vs. Smith, 9 Serg. & Raw. 33;
Pipkin vs. Wynns, 2 Dev. (Law) 402, 404; Stark vs. MeGowen,
1 Nott & MeO. 387; Yowng vs. Harrison, 9 Geo. 359, s. c. 6
Id. 131; Nashville vs. Shelby, 10 Yerg. 280; Gales vs. Anderson,
13 Ill. 413.
While, as above observed, most of the states (Cloys vs. Keats,
18 Ark. 19, 20 Id. 561; Memphis vs. Overton, 3 Yerg. 387, 5
Id. 189, 10 Id. 280; Sparks vs. White, 7 Humph. 86 ; Lawless
vs. Bees, 1 Bibb. (Ky.) 495, s. c. 4 Id. 309 ; Ti-ustees vs. Boon,
2 J. J. Marsh. 224; Trustees vs. Wagnon, 2 A. K. Marsh. 379;
Harvie vs. Cammack, 6 Dana 242 ; Prosser vs. Wappello County,
18 Iowa; Angell on Tide Waters 171-178, and cases above cited)
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recognise the superior claim of the riparian owner to a ferry if
one is established, yet the legislature may authorize the franchise
to be conferred upon another than the owner of the soil.
But the grant of a ferry license does not authorize the bolder
thereof to use the land of another without his consent, or without
making due compensation. The state may obtain the right to
use the land of private individuals for ferry purposes, but this
must be done under the right of eminent domain, and just com-
pensation be made.
It is scarcely necessary to add that a riparian proprietor cannot
be deprived of his common law ferry rights, though these, as we
have seen, are quite limited, or of those conferred upon him by
statute, without just compensation: Somerville vs. Wimbish, 7
Gratt. (Va.) 205. Compare, Patrick vs. Ruffners, 2 Rob. (Va.)
Rep. 209 (1843); Young vs. Rarrison, 9 Geo. 359, s. c. 6 Id.
131; Cooper vs. Smith, 9 Serg. & R. 33; Pipkin vs. Wynns, 2
Dev. (Law) 402; Bowman vs. Wathen, 2 McLean 376; Prosser
vs. Wappello County, 18 Iowa Rep. (not yet published)
SEc. 4. How the .Perry Right8 of Riparian Owner may be extin-
guished-ffect of Location of Public Highway to the bank of
the river, &c.
It is doubtless competent to grant or convey the soil and except
or reserve the right of ferry, or the right to use the land for the
purpose of embarking and receiving passengers: Peter vs. Ken-
dal, 6 B. & C. 703, per BAILEY, J.; Bowman vs. Wat hen, 2
McLean 371, per McLEAN, J.
But the most interesting practical question under this head is
one which has several times arisen for adjudication, and which
may be stated thus: Does the location of a county road or of a
public highway, or the dedication by the owner of land for this
purpose (he retaining the fee), deprive, to the extent of its width
on the bank of the river, the riparian owner of his rights of ferry
as above defined? A -kindred question is this: Can the state
authorize a person other than such owner, without the owner's
consent and without compensating him for the right, to use the
termini of such road upon the bank of a river for the purpose of
landing ferry-boats, receiving and discharging passengers, &c.
The state of the law on this subject can only be intelligibly
ascertained by a brief reference to the authorities.
In the case of Peter vs. Kendal, before referred to, BAILEY, J.,
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in commenting upon the case in Savile's Reports (supra, sec. 2),
says: ,I am of opinion that it is not necessary that the owner
of a ferry should have the property in the soil on either side. He
must have the right to land on both sides, but it is sufficient if
the landing-place be in a public highway. This is perfectly con-
sistent with the principle laid down in Savile."
There was no question in the case about the right to use the
public road for a ferry-landing against the consent of the owner
of the fee, and the remark above italicised is purely obiter. (See
this decision approvingly commented on by Kent, 3 Coifim. 421,
note.) No other English case has been met with by us. There
are a number of American cases upon the subject.
In Chambers vs. Furey, 1 Yeates (Pa.) 167 (1792), it was de-
cided that the dedication or laying out of ground as a public
road gave no right to the defendants, the owners of a ferry, to
land upon or receive freights from the plaintiff's freehold on the
banks of a navigable river, without his consent. That the owner
of a ferry has no right, without such consent, to land his boats
passengers, or freights upon a .public highway, see, also, Cooper
vs. Smith, 9 Serg. & Raw. 31 (1822), not even,°it was held in a
subsequent case in the same state, at the terminus of a highway,
between high and low water mark: Chess vs. Manoun, 3 Watts
219 (1834).
In the thoroughly-considered case of Pearsall vs. Post, 20
Wend. 111, 131, the doctrine of the Pennsylvania cases, above
cited, was arguendo approved by CowEN, J., who delivered the
opinion of the Supreme Court; by the Supreme Court of Iowa in
Prosser vs. Wappello County, 8upra; and by ALLEN, J., in
Patrick vs. Ruffners, 2 Rob. (Va.) 209, 221; but see opinion
by BALDWIN, J., Id. 214, 219; compare Somerville vs. Wimbish,
7 Gratt. 205.
In Pipkin vs. Wynns, 2 Dev. (Law) 402, overruling Raynor
vs. Dowdy, 1 Murph. 279, it was similarly held that compensa-
tion must be made to the owner of the fee for the use of the soil
as a landing-place for a ferry, although such landing-place be at
the terminus of a public road leading to the river on both sides.'
1 Setting forth the grounds of this decision, HENDERSON, C. J., in the case cited
from 2 Dev. 402, says: "For the uses and purposes of a highway it [the high-
way] is the sovereign's-the public's-for all other purposes it is the former
proprietor's. The right of using it as a landing-place for a ferry has never been
taken from him; and although there is scarcely a perceptible difference between
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And such is the decision substantially in Prosser vs. Wappello
County, 18 Iowa (not yet published).
Our conclusion, from the authorities as well as upon principle,
is: 1st, That the dedication or taking of land for a highway does
not, in cases in which the owner retains the fee and the public
acquire only. an easement of passage, deprive such owner of his
stepping from a boat on the land laid out as a public road, and stepping from
land to land, yet that has never been taken from the former proprietor for such
purposes, as he has never been compensated for the right [limited, we suppose,
as stated in the text of this article] of transporting persons across the water-
course, as that was not considered when the price of taking the land for a high-
way was fixed, and although it is of but little value without the franchise, yet
his ownership of the land gives him the preferable right to call for the franchise
when a ferry becomes necessary. This right is valuable, for unless there are
good reasons to the contrary the sovereign must grant it to the owner, as sove-
reigns are bound to be just." * .A * * " If it be asked what is to be done if the
owner of land, where a ferry Is necessary, refuses to receive the fraiachise, it is
answered, pay him for the land and grant it to another." * * * * "Let it not
be taken for a road and used as a ferry." As to the nature of the respective
rights of the public in a highway and of the owner of the land through which it
runs, see authorities-cited at the conclusion of this article. The subject is fur-
ther illustrated by the course of decision in Virginia.
There the county courts are authorized by the General Assembly (2 Rev. Code
of Va., ch. 238) to establish ferries on public roads through watercourses. The 1st
section applies to cases where the applicant is the owner of the land on both
sides, and the 3d section of the act extends the authority to cases in which he is
the owner on one side only. The statute contains no provision for condemning
land on the opposite side, where the applicant is the owner but on one side.
"The ownership of the land and the existence of the public road are, under
this law, essential to the jurisdiction of the county court:" per BALDWIN, J.,
Bomerville vs. Wimbish, 7 Gratt. (Va.) 228.
And it is held in this case that the establishment of a.ferry confers upon the
grantee of the right no title to any portion of the soil on the other side of the
stream. On this point the court (Id. 230) observes: "The Commonwealth con-
fers, by her grant of the franchise, such right in regard to the landing on the
opposite shore, as she may lawfully impart, and no more. The very object of the
grant carries with it whatever privilege the public then has or may thereafter
acquire to the use of the highway there for that purpose; and if the grantee
claims anything more he must show a title to it by private contract. It is not to
be supposed for a moment that the Commonwealth contemplates, by the creation
of the franchise, what it is beyond her power to grant, the invasion of the pro-
perty of others without compensation." * * * "Whether it will carry the pritvi-
lege of using any of the public road on the opposite land, for the purpose of landing
or taking passengers, Jc., is a question which we deem it unnecessarj to determine :"
Id. 232. As to this latter question the judges differed in opinion in the prior
case of Patrick vs. .Ruffners, 2 Rob. (Va.) 209, vide opinions by ALLEN and
BALDwIN, JJ.
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preferable right to a ferry, if one is established. (Memphis vs.
Overton, 3 Yerg. 387, and authorities above.)
2. That a ferry license to a stranger (that is, to one other than
the riparian owner) will not authorize him, against the consent
of the owner, or without compensating him for this specific right,
to use the termini of such highway for the purpose of fastening
boats and of receiving and discharging freights and passengers.
Such a use is not, properly speaking, a public use; but rather
a use by the licensee for his own advantage and private gain.'
Like the use of an ordinary road for railroad purposes, such a
use for ferry purposes (and the cases are strikingly analogous)
would be an additional and different burden or servitude; for
which compensation must be made to the owner. See on this
point the following recent cases: Mfahon vs. The _New York, &c.,
Railroad Co., 24 N. Y. 658 (1860), Id. 655; BTis8ell vs. The New
York, &c., Railroad Co., 23 N. Y. 61 (1861); Wager vs. Troy,
ie., Railroad Co., 25 N. Y. 526 (1862); Williams vs. New York
Central Railroad Co., 16 N. Y. 97 (1857), where the case of The
Philadelphia and Trenton Railroad Co., 6 Whart. 25, contra, is
reviewed, and the reasoning of GIBSON, C. J.,' questioned and
denied.
A different rule applies, it seems, where the owner of the soil
does not retain the fee: The Ohio, &c:, Railroad Co. vs. Apple-
gate, 8 Dana (Ky.) 289; Williams vs. New York Central Rail-
road Co., supra, arguendo; Wager vs. Troy, &c., Railroad Co.,
supra, p. 533; Milburn vs. Cedar Rapids, &c., 12 Iowa 246, 259.
And generally as to nature of the public easement in highway,
.see, in addition, The Presbyterian Society, &c., vs. Railroad Co.,
3 Hill N. Y. 567; Sir John Lade's Case, 2 Str. 1004; Inhab.
of Springfield vs. Railroad Co., 4 Cush. 63; Williams vs. Plank-
Road Co., 21 Mo. 580, holding the locating of a plank-road upon
a county road to be an additional burden; Redfield on Railways
158, author's opinion in text, and his valuable notes to Sec. XIV.
to Chap. XI., concerning "Eminent -Domain," and cases there
collected and reviewed. J. F. D.
I
I On this thought, ALLEN, J., in Patrick vs. Ruffners, 2 Rob. (Va.) Rep. 222,
holds the following language:-
"Ferries are usually found on public roads; and the public having the right
of passage, there can be no question that any individual, in the exercise of this
right, may transport himself and property across the stream, and use the road as
a larding, and that the owner cannot obstruct him. But it does not follow that
he can convert this personal right into a source of emolument, and at his own
pleasure use the road as a landing for a ferry."
